We survey the literature on electoral competition under plurality rule where candidacy decisions are endogenous. We organize the di¤erentcontributions into three families based on the paradigm to which they belong and on the part of the set of candidates they endogenize. We argue that endoegenous candidacy o¤ers both theoretical and empirical advantages over the standard Hotelling-Downs model. On the theoretical front, these models can provide a more satisfactory microfoundation for the emergence and/or stability of the two party system under plurality rule. On the empirical front these models o¤er a better account of the stylized facts about elections, particularly regarding Duverger's law and policy polarization. We also point to shortcomings of these models and propose some directions for future research.
INTRODUCTION
Regularly held, and contested, elections are considered to be an essential characteristic of a well functioning democratic system. It is therefore unsurprising that electoral competition is an extensively studied aspect of the political process. In the political economy literature, which seeks to understand the e¤ect of political processes on economic policies, electoral competition is often used as a shorthand for politics; policies are assumed to emerge from elections rather than being chosen by a social planner. The most commonly used model of electoral competition, the Hotelling-Downs model, has become a standard feature of many microeconomics textbooks. 1 This article provides an overview of some of the advances in modeling electoral competition that go beyond this standard textbook model. In particular, we will survey a class of models that can be termed "endogenous candidacy models" of electoral competition. We argue that these models provide a better account of the stylized facts of electoral competition and are also based on more satisfactory theoretical underpinnings. We will limit our analysis to plurality rule elections. In another survey, Dellis and Oak (2015 (b) ), looks at the literature on comparative analysis of di¤erent electoral rules with endogenous candidacy.
This article is organized as follows: the remainder of this section will review and critique the canonical Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition; in Section 2 we will present some stylized facts regarding the number and positions of political parties in elections across di¤erent countries; in Section 3 we will introduce a threeway classi…cation of the endogenous candidacy models and discuss them in turn; …nally, in Section 4, we will compare the insights o¤ered by three families of models and conclude by pointing out directions for future research in the …eld.
A Brief Overview of the Hotelling-Downs Model
In the canonical Hotelling-Downs model (see Duggan (2006) for a modern treatment) the set of feasible policies is represented as points on the left-to-right spectrum of a line. Two o¢ ce-seeking candidates compete by choosing points on the line which represent the policies they commit to implementing if elected. Voters have ideal policy positions along di¤erent points on the line and are assumed to have distance preferences, i.e., a voter's utility decreases in the distance between her ideal policy and the implemented policy. An election is held under the plurality rule, and the candidate winning the biggest share of votes is elected. The celebrated median voter theorem states that the equilibrium policy positions of the two candidates will be identical to the median voters'ideal policy. The simplicity and intuitive appeal of this result makes it one of the most popular concepts in political economy. As pointed out in Callander (2005; 1116) : "This powerful result has provided the foundation for insight into many areas of political economy, including in ‡uential models on the size of government, the nature of redistributive policies, and the rate of economic growth."
However, there are some shortcomings of the Hotelling-Downs model and its prediction, the median voter theorem, which we shall brie ‡y discuss. Not only is there a divergence in the policy platforms via-à-vis the median voter's position, the degree of divergence also varies across space and time (e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) and the evidence presented in Section 2). This …nding suggests the need for a richer model that incorporates factors left out of the canonical model. We will discuss some further empirical evidence related to this point in the next section.
2. Non-robustness of Equilibrium Existence. The existence of equilibrium in the canonical Hotelling-Downs model depends crucially on there being two candidates and one policy dimension. With more than two candidates the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium itself is not guaranteed. Furthermore, when the policy space is multi-dimensional, equilibrium generically does not exist. This makes the Hotelling-Downs model a poor representation of elections that have more than two candidates or which are contested on more than one dimension.
A well known result, Duverger's law, which we discuss in the next section in detail, states that the polities using the plurality rule tend to lead to a two-party system. It might be tempting to argue, in light of Duverger's law, that the assumption of two parties is without much loss of generality in plurality rule elections. 2 We will take up this issue in the next subsection. 
STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT ELECTORAL COMPETITION UNDER PLURALITY RULE
In reviewing the models of electoral competition with endogenous candidacy we will emphasize on the ability of these models to account for the following two stylized facts. 1) Duverger's law: plurality rule elections tend to favor a two party system; 2) Polarization: the political parties/candidates, not just the fringe players but also the serious contenders, do not always adopt convergent policy platforms. The canonical Hotelling-Downs model sidesteps the …rst stylized fact by exogenously assuming two parties whereas its prediction of convergence to the median voter policy is not supported in the data.
Below we discuss in some detail each of these stylized facts and present some empirical evidence pertaining to each.
Duverger' s Law
In his seminal contribution (see Duverger (1954)), Maurice Duverger identi…ed an empirical regularity of elections, namely, that the plurality rule tends to favor a two-party system. Riker (1982) has dubbed this empirical regularity.
A standard measure of the number of parties that is used in the political science literature is the E¤ective Number of Parties. (Laakso and Taagepera (1979) ). The EN P in a given election is obtained by taking the inverse of the sum of squared vote shares of the participating parties (v i s). The precise formula is given by:
Thus, the EN P measure varies from 1 (when one party obtains all the votes) to I
where I is the number of parties participating in the election. Defenders of the canonical Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition might argue that in light of Duverger's law assuming two party competition is not too bad an assumption to make for studying plurality rule elections. This would then vindicate the use of the median voter theorem, at least for the case of one-dimensional competition. However, Duverger's law is explained in terms of strategic behavior on part of the voters whereas most of the models assume sincere voting, in particular, since most models treat the set of voters as a continuum. This being the case, we need to seek explanation for Duverger's Law elsewhere, one obvious candidate being strategic behavior of the political parties. Hence, the endogenous candidacy models have the potential to provide another channel for Duverger's Law, one that does not rely on voter's strategic behavior.
Polarization in Plurality Rule elections
The median voter result, while being a sharp prediction of much convenience for tractable models of political economy, is not always supported by data. In Table 2 we present, for the same set of countries and time period as above, the average degree of polarization across elections. Polarization is a measure of how di¤erent the platforms of the competing parties are, along the left-right dimension.
A party system is said to be heavily polarized if all the parties are located at the extremes. Polarization is said to be absent if all the parties are located at the center (Sartori (1976) ). Formally, polarization is calculated as the weighted sum of squared distances between each party's position on a left-right scale and the center of gravity of the party system, which is itself the weighted average of all the parties' positions on the left-right scale (e.g., see Lupu (2015) ). Thus we have,
where v i is party i's vote share and p i is the policy position of party i on the leftright policy spectrum with the center of gravity, denoted by p, which is obtained by the formula The above table shows that, on average, it is usual to see between 10% to 20% polarization (100% being complete polarization). Across di¤erent elections that number can vary as well. The next section discusses various models of endogenous candidacy and their success (or lack thereof) in explaining the stylized facts discussed above.
MODELS WITH ENDOGENOUS CANDIDACY
A key assumption of the Hotelling-Downs model is the pure o¢ ce motivation of candidates. In fact, candidates that are purely o¢ ce motivated are referred to as Downsian candidates and the models assuming pure o¢ ce motivation of the candidates are said to belong to the Downsian paradigm. Empirical evidence as well as common sense suggests that there is more than rents from o¢ ce that motivates individuals to pursue a career in politics. An alternative paradigm, the partisan paradigm, assumes that candidates are policy-motivated, i.e., they intrinsically care about the policy outcome (see, for instance, Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985) ). We classify the models with endogenous candidacy into three families. The di¤erent families are classi…ed along two dimensions: 1) whether the candidates are Downsian or Partisan, and 2) whether the entire set of candidates or only a part of it is endogenized. Models in the …rst two families belong to the Downsian paradigm while those in the third family belong to the partisan paradigm. The …rst family of models treats some parties as already established in the political arena while other parties are potential entrants. The focus is on the strategic entry decision of this latter group and its implications for policy polarization. The second family of models does not privilege any group with an incumbency advantage and treats all parties as capable of entering or staying out. The third family of models, known as the citizen-candidate models, departs from the …rst two families in the o¢ ce motivation assumption. Instead in these models candidates, just like citizens, are endowed with policy preferences. In the canonical citizen-candidate models it is further assumed that the only credible policy for a candidate to implement is his ideal policy. As in the second family of models, the entire set of candidates is endogenous.
The following simple diagram will help clarify the three-family classi…cation used by us. In our discussion of these models we will highlight the predictions they make on both the degree of polarization and the number of parties running for election, and compare the models in terms of the intuition driving the results.
Models with Threat of Entry (and Entry Deterrence)
The canonical model in this family considers an election with two established candidates who face (the threat of) entry by a third candidate. The seminal papers in this area are Palfrey (1984) 6 Voters are assumed to vote sincerely, for the candidate whose position is closest to their respective ideal policies.
The substantively di¤erent (to Hotelling-Downs) conclusion reached by these papers is that the threat of entry induces the established parties to assume divergent positions, on either side of the median voter. Thus, these models are better able to capture policy divergence observed in political races in the real world. Owing to the vote maximization assumption, these models also have the feature that the third candidate enters the race even when he is sure to lose the election. Second, for cases in-between the two polar cases of systematic entry (q = 0) and of entry occurring only when it guarantees a majority (q > 1=2), i.e., q 2 (0; 1=2], 6 The objective of vote-share maximization is not without criticism in the literature. Indeed, in elections with three or more candidates, a candidate who wins the election may increase his vote share by moving closer to another candidate. But this move may also result in him losing the election by triggering a bigger increase in the vote share of another candidate. We revisit this assumption at the end of the section. To obtain equilibria which exhibit polarization and have the incentives for the third candidate to enter on the ‡anks, one needs to deviate from the standard assumptions about voter and/or candidate objective functions or information. For instance, Callander and Wilson (2007) allows for voter abstention due to alienation, 7 which reinstates the centrifugal force that induces established candidates to polarize. Moreover, the potential entrant is shown to enter (when he chooses to do so) at the extremes, which is consistent with empirical observations. Another justi…cation for the potential entrant's decision to enter the race could be that the entrant's candidacy is expressively motivated, e.g. the entrant seeking publicity in the media. Alternatively, Palfrey (1984) conjectures that the introduction of candidates'uncertainty about the distribution of voters'ideal policies might permit the entrant to be elected with a positive probability in equilibrium.
Callander ( Duverger's law, an equilibrium with multiple national parties can exist when there is su¢ cient, but not too much, heterogeneity across districts. Thus, Callander's model has the appealing property of being able to explain both Duverger's law as well as its exceptions. Key to explain polarization is that when districts are heterogeneous in the position of their respective median voter, the national parties being positioned symmetrically in one district implies they are asymmetrically positioned in another district. If the national parties are not su¢ ciently polarized, the latter district-speci…c potential entrant can then enter on a ‡ank and win the seat.
Hotelling-Downs Model with Endogenous Candidacy
One criticism of the models discussed above, at least in their canonical form, is that they are stacked in favor of the Duvergerian prediction by assuming two preestablished candidates. In other words, these models can explain the stability of the two-party system but not its emergence. The second family of models seeks to break this asymmetry of treatment between established and potential candidates. occurs as a way to deter or limit the impact of further entry. Sengupta and Sengupta (2008) shows that the threat of exit (as opposed to the threat of entry as in the Palfrey-Weber models) can also produce equilibria with divergent policy positions. The authors add a second candidacy stage before the election, at which each candidate can decide whether to withdraw from the race and save some fraction of the entry cost. They show that the option of withdrawing from the race can generate a centrifugal force that leads candidates to polarize.
Interestingly, it is the possibility of exit that can serve to deter potential candidates from deviating from their policy platforms at the entry stage.
Feddersen, Sened and Wright (1990) studies a Downsian model of endogenous candidacy but, in contrast to all the papers previously discussed, assumes the voting behavior to be strategic rather than sincere. The authors show that an equilibrium always exists and has the entrants locating at the median voter's ideal policy. Thus we get, once again, the median voter result. Moreover, as was noted by the authors themselves, the result relies crucially on a potential candidate being deterred from entering at a non-median position by the (correct) anticipation that all the voters who prefer the median to the deviator's position will coordinate on one of the candidates standing at the median, thereby defeating the deviator. Thus, the result relies on an implausible assumption of a rather …ne degree of voter coordination.
To sum up, the Hotelling-Downs models of endogenous candidacy can, under suitable assumptions to ensure equilibrium existence, explain the emergence as well as stability of a two party system à la Duverger. This marks an improvement over the …rst family of models. However, these models get a mixed grade for explaining policy divergence. In particular, Duvergerian equilibria tend to be convergent and non-convergent equilibria tend to be non-Duvergerian, (Osborne (2000) , and Sengupta and Sengupta (2008) being the notable exceptions.) The family of models we consider next has the potential simultaneously to explain both stylized facts simultaneously. In considering this family we will be moving away from the Downsian paradigm to the partisan paradigm.
The Citizen-candidate Models
In citizen-candidate models every potential candidate is a citizen who, just like any other citizen, has preferences over policies. The canonical model in this family considers a set of citizens who must elect a representative to choose policy. Each citizen can decide whether to become a candidate, after which citizens vote over the set of self-declared candidates and the candidate who gets elected chooses policy.
The models in this family have been used for investigating several issues. These include the issues we focus on in this review, viz. the number of candidates and the extent of polarization, but also other issues such as equilibrium (non) genericity, comparison of electoral systems, the e¢ ciency of policy outcomes, the e¤ects of lobbying or the identity of politicians (e.g., their policy preferences, their quality).
A canonical citizen-candidate model has three stages: in the …rst stage, each citizen decides whether to become a candidate by incurring an entry cost; in the second stage, an election is held over the set of candidates to decide the winner; in stage three, the winner implements a policy. The solution concept used is sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in sincere or undominated voting strategies. 9 Since this is a one-shot game, and the winning candidate has a preferred policy, sub-game perfection requires that he chooses his ideal policy. This makes the third stage decision trivial, and it reduces the stage one decision to one about whether to run, but not which platform on which to run.
The two seminal contributions in this literature are Osborne and Slivinski (1996) , and Besley and Coate (1997). These contributions di¤er in two important ways. Osborne and Slivinski consider a unidimensional policy space and assume voting behavior to be sincere. Besley and Coate, on the other hand, allow the policy space to be multidimensional and assume voting behavior to be strategic.
In order to facilitate a comparison with the earlier models we will focus on the Osborne-Slivinski version of the citizen-candidate model. For now we will consider the polar opposite case of purely policy motivated candidates. Note however, that the results we present below are robust to adding small rents from o¢ ce.
The authors classify possible equilibria into three classes, those involving one, two and multiple candidates. In one-candidate equilibria, the candidate must be located at a position su¢ ciently close to the median so that no other potential candidate wants to enter the race. A candidate whose ideal policy lies further away from the median voter's ideal policy would be defeated and would not want to enter the race. A candidate whose ideal policy lies closer to the median would be preferred by the median voter, and thus a majority of voters, and would be elected outright. A candidate whose ideal policy is as far away from the median would leave the median voter indi¤erent and would tie for …rst place. In the latter two cases, a second potential candidate is deterred from entering the race if his expected utility gain from implementing his ideal policy is smaller than the candidacy cost.
In two-candidate equilibria, each candidate must tie for …rst place, otherwise, the losing candidate would be better o¤ not running since he would save the candidacy cost without changing the policy outcome. By the same logic, the two candidates must be standing at two di¤erent positions, otherwise, one of them would be better o¤ not running; he would save the candidacy cost without changing the policy outcome. Given that the two candidates must be tying for …rst place while standing at two di¤erent positions, their ideal policies must be located symmetrically around the median so that they split equally the votes and tie for …rst place.
In a two-candidate equilibrium neither of the two candidates should be better o¤ not running and no other potential candidate should want to enter the race. The former happens when the two candidates are su¢ ciently polarized, so that their expected utility gain from adopting their ideal policy exceeds the candidacy cost.
The latter happens when the two candidates are close enough to each other so that a potential candidate entering in-between would be defeated or would face a candidacy cost that exceeds his expected utility gain from being elected and adopting his ideal policy. Observe that potential candidates with more extreme ideal policies are necessarily deterred from entering the race since they would split votes with the candidate on their side of the median, thereby triggering the outright election of the other, less preferred, candidate.
Equilibria with more than two candidates do not exist. 10 If a multi-candidate equilibrium were to exist, the leftmost candidate or the rightmost candidate (or both) would be better o¤ not running since his votes would be transferred to his closest neighbor. This vote transfer would improve the electoral prospects of this neighboring candidate and worsen the electoral prospects of the other candidates.
This rules out the existence of equilibria with three or more candidates running for election.
To sum up, the canonical citizen-candidate model is capable of simultaneously explaining the emergence of a Duvergerian two candidate outcome as well as policy divergence away from the median voter's position. Moreover, an equilibrium always exists, even beyond the one-dimensional policy space. Another strength of the citizen-candidate models is their ability to explain a well known exception to Duverger's law, namely, the existence of spoiler candidates. 11 These are candidates who run to spoil the election prospects of another candidate even though they do not stand a chance to win. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the previous section we discussed three families of endogenous candidacy models of elections under plurality rule. We argued that the need for these models arose due to both theoretical and empirical shortcomings of the Hotelling-Downs model. In particular, we discussed the need to explain two stylized facts: 1) the emergence and stability of the two party system under plurality rule (and its exceptions), 2) the existence of polarization (sometimes substantial) in the policy positions of the contending parties. We found that there exist models in each family that could explain the above stylized facts, but di¤erent models generate these results through di¤erent channels. We will now provide a comparative perspective on these di¤erences across models.
A Comparative Analysis of the Three Families
Let's …rst look at the issue of polarization. In the Palfrey-Weber model, the established candidates face two con ‡icting forces. With the established candidates located on the two sides of the median, each can gain by moving closer to the median-this is the centripetal force. However, if one candidate, say the leftist, were to move too close to the median, he will invite the new entrant to enter at a position slightly left of him. This threat generates the centrifugal force. The equilibrium is obtained at locations where the two forces, the centripetal force and the centrifugal force, are in balance; such a point has both candidates locating at positions that are divergent from the median. By contrast, the citizen-candidate model does not have the centripetal or centrifugal forces, since the candidates are immobile. In this family of models, the polarized positions occur because of the mutually reinforcing presence of a pair of candidates-the presence of, say, the leftist candidate on the opposite side makes the rightist candidate not want to quit the race because doing so will mean a loss in utility due to a distant policy being implemented. This insight also sheds light on why the citizen-candidate models su¤er from the multiplicity of equilibria, each created by mutually reinforcing incentives for each candidate generated by the presence of the opposite side's candidate. On the other hand, the second family of models are not particularly successful in generating polarized equilibria.
Contrasting the Downsian paradigm of the …rst two families with the partisan paradigm of the third, we can see the role played by policy commitment in driving the convergence result. Polarization arises in citizen-candidate models because of the inability of candidates to commit to policies, which eliminates the centripetal force that would induce two candidates on either side of the median to converge. Secondly, all three types of models can generate Duvergerian outcomes. However on this front, the …rst family, i.e., the Palfrey-Weber models, are not particularly satisfactory because, in their canonical form, they assume the presence of two established candidates. Thus, while these models can succeed in showing the stability of a two party system, they do not show its emergence. However, there also exist entry-accommodating equilibria, i.e., equilibria with more than two candidates.
These equilibria are a mixed news. On the one hand they could be bought as shown the presence of spoiler candidates, an empirically documented phenomenon.
However, on the other hand, this result is driven by the vote share maximization assumption. Moreover, with a few exceptions discussed earlier, the third candidate enters at the center, rather than at the ‡anks of the established candidates, which does not match the stylized facts since sometimes new parties enter on the extremes as well. In the second family of models, with the exception of Osborne (2000) and Sengupta and Sengupta (2008) , Duvergerian equilibria are also convergent. The existence of polarized, Duvergerian equilibria arises rather naturally in the citizencandidate models. Moreover, unlike the …rst family, the emergence of this outcome is entirely endogenous. One important insight provided by these models is that Duverger's law does need not arise due to the wasting-the-vote e¤ect as argued by Maurice Duverger but it can also arise due to strategic behavior of endogenous candidates.
Other Avenues of Research: Current and Future
The endogenous candidacy models open up avenues for addressing other questions that naturally arise once we treat candidates as endogenous. We could not cover some of these in our survey while others are in their nascent stage and are worthy of future research.
One issue analyzed in a related paper (see Dellis and Oak (2015 (b) )) is that of comparative properties of alternative voting rules. In particular, the citizen- Finally, one issue deserving further attention is one of the formation of political parties. In the literature reviewed in this paper, there was essentially no distinction between a party and a candidate. However, much of the political science literature, including the work of Maurice Duverger, takes the formation and evolution of political parties and issues surrounding them seriously. These issues include how parties are formed, how their internal functioning a¤ects selection of policies and candidates. Also, the existence of political parties creates reputational concerns both across time and constituencies. Hence, a more satisfactory treatment of political parties is required for building more satisfactory models of political competition.
The need to articulate the relationship between candidates and political parties is particularly signi…cant in the citizen-candidate models, where candidates are endowed with policy preferences, than in models of the other two families, where candidates are concerned only by their electoral performance. Morelli (2004) and Levy (2004) are attempts at introducing parties in the citizen-candidate approach, where parties act as commitment device for implementing announced policies. We believe that further research is required in this area.
